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BOOK REVIEWS
MICHIGAN AND FEDERAL ESTATE AND TAx PLANNING. By Peter 1.
Chirco and Sidney C. Ward. Mundelein, Ill.: Callaghan. 1965.
Pp. 426. $25.

Any evaluation of a book of this nature must be made in light
of its purpose and its intended audience. The authors recognize
that estate and tax planning is too broad a subject to be treated
comprehensively in a single volume, and, consequently, they quite
properly made no effort in that direction. Rather, their apparent
purpose was to furnish the non-specialist with an annotated form
book containing textual discussions of tax and estate planning problems, with particular emphasis on local Michigan law.
I.

TEXTUAL MATERIAL

The value of the authors' textual material depends upon the
use to which it is put. If a reader uses it only as a means of orienting himself so that he might better understand the purpose of the
authors' forms, the text is a helpful aid. However, it is not likely
to be helpful to a reader who is seeking instruction on specific problems that lurk in the estate and gift tax law. The difficulty with using
the text for research or planning purposes is that it is written too
concisely: in order to achieve brevity of presentation, the authors
tend to state broad general principles rather than to provide an
analysis of the problems involved or of the many exceptions to the
general rules. There is a significant danger that the stating of a
"black letter" principle, unadorned by a discussion of policy considerations or hypothetical illustrations, may convey to the reader
an entirely different message from that which the authors intended.
This danger is magnified where a substantive area is not fully
treated at one place in the book, but rather is discussed partially in
several different chapters. Since the cross-referencing and index do
not always alert the reader to the fact that he should investigate
further, there is a risk that he will discover only a fragment of a
picture but believe it to be the entire work. For example, the book
contains a six-page chapter on the federal estate tax, of which one
brief paragraph is devoted to sections 2036 through 2038 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. As would be expected, that paragraph does not adequately explain those three sections, although
they are probably the most difficult provisions to comprehend in
the estate and gift tax field. Admittedly, additional discussion of
those sections is set forth seven chapters later, at several widely
separated places in the chapter on inter vivos trusts, and there are
[ 1024]

Recent Books

1025

pertinent references to them elsewhere in the book. 1 Nonetheless,
again the cross-references and index to the book do not readily
"flag" these other areas, so that all or part of the additional discussion of those sections may well be overlooked by the reader. The
textual material thus serves only to sketch the substantive law
and to alert the practitioner to troublesome areas. Of course, reasonable men can differ as to the extent of textual discussion that is
desirable for a book of this kind and the value of brevity ought not
to be under-estimated. Nevertheless, even allowing for the very limited purpose of the text, portions of it are so brief as to raise the
question whether they ought either to have been greatly expanded
or omitted entirely.
An important justification for the textual material is the usefulness to the practitioner of having a concise correlation of local
Michigan law with federal tax problems. One example of this
approach is the authors' chapter on the federal estate and gift tax
consequences attending the joint ownership of property. Since the
federal gift tax consequences of creating or terminating joint ownership interests in property often turn on the rights of the joint owners
under local law, the authors quite correctly discuss Michigan property law as well. However, several aspects of the Michigan property
law of joint ownership that are highly significant in determining
federal gift tax consequences are strangely omitted from the textual
discussion. Before considering the Michigan law in question, it
would be useful to review briefly the federal tax issues the resolutions of which are dependent upon Michigan law.
The authors note that the gift tax consequences of creating or
terminating joint ownership of property2 may depend upon whether
any co-owner, acting without the consent of the other co-owner(s),
has the power to terminate the owners' survivorship rights. If not,
the value of the property interest received by a co-owner either on
creation or termination of the joint ownership is determined by an
actuarial valuation of such co-owner's interest: that is, in valuing
each owner's interest in the property, account must be taken of a
co-owner's prospect of gaining the property interests of the other
co-owners on their death and the said co-owner's risk of losing his
property interest on his death, because of the provision for survivorship. If, on the other hand, a single co-owner, acting without the
consent of the other owners, is able to terminate the survivorship
1. In the chapter on gifts and the gift tax there is a reference on the estate tax
consequences of gifts to minors by a donor-custodian under a Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act.
2. As used herein, the term "joint ownership" refers to a co-ownership of property where the interest of a co-owner passes upon his death to the surviving co-owner
or co-owners by operation of law. The term does not, therefore, include tenancies
in common where there are no rights of survivorship.
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rights of the owners, no actuarial computation is required and the
property value is allocated among the several co-owners according
to their respective percentage interests therein.
The authors point out that a Michigan tenancy by the entirety
cannot be severed by either party acting alone and that therefore
actuarial computations may be required to determine the gift tax
consequences where such tenancies are created or terminated. 3 The
authors do not however discuss the peculiar state of the law in
Michigan concerning the power of one co-owner (other than a tenant
by the entirety) of property, acting alone, to terminate the survivorship rights of the co-owners. Although generally a joint tenancy (in
contrast to a tenancy by the entirety) may be terminated by any
joint tenant irrespective of whether the other tenants consent, the
Michigan Supreme Court has held that the survivorship rights of
joint tenants cannot be terminated by any one joint tenant acting
alone where the deed creating the joint ownership expressly provides for the right of survivorship or for an ultimate distribution
to a survivor. Thus, provisions such as "joint tenants with right of
survivorship, and not as tenants in common,"'4 "joint tenants and
not tenants in common, and to the survivor thereof,"5 "unto [A]
and [B] or survivor," ' or "to them and the survivor of them,"' have
been held to create rights of survivorship which cannot be terminated by one co-owner without the others' consent. The rationale
for so holding is that in such cases the co-owners actually have "joint
life estates followed by a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor."" It would appear virtually certain that the federal estate
and gift tax rules concerning joint tenancies apply to such so-called
life estates with contingent remainders, since the federal laws are
intended to operate on property which is co-owned by parties having
rights of survivorship, regardless of the "tag" employed by local
law in characterizing the parties' interests. Stated differently, federal
tax law depends upon the rights of parties under local state law but
3. The authors' statement that Michigan spouses cannot hold personal property

as tenants by the entirety presumably was written prior to the promulgation of the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d
38 (1964), which not only held that spouses could hold certain kinds of personal
property by the entirety but actually made it difficult for spouses to avoid that form
of ownership. The DeYoung case applied to property listed in MicH. ComP. LAws
§ 557.151 (1948), viz., bonds, certificates of stock mortgages, promissory notes, debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness payable to a husband and wife. For a
pre-DeYoung discussion of whether Michigan spouses could hold personal property
as tenants by the entirety, see Bienenfeld, Creditors v. Tenancies by the Entirety, 1
WAYNE L. REv. 105, 108-10 (1955).
4. Mannausa v. Mannausa, 374 Mich. 6, 130 N.W.2d 900 (1964); Ballard v. Wilson,
364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961).
5. Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215, 287 N.W. 439 (1939).
6. Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W.2d 715 (1952).
7. Schulz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N.W. 1012 (1898).
8. Ballard v. Wilson, 364 Mich. 479, 484, 110 N.W.2d 751, 753-54 (1961).
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the name given by the state to those rights is irrelevantY Consequently, where joint tenants hold Michigan property under a deed
containing a provision for survivorship, it would appear that the
value of each co-tenant's interest for gift tax purposes must be determined according to actuarial tables furnished by the Internal
Revenue Service. 10 The authors should have made some mention
of this issue in their book, which, after all, is specifically aimed at
Michigan practice.
Another interesting and related problem which the authors fail
to discuss is the question of whether a husband is entitled to all of
the income from property that he holds with his wife as tenants
by the entirety or whether the income is to be divided between
them. If the husband is entitled to all of the income, the valuation
of the interests of the husband and wife for gift tax purposes must
take into account this exceptional right of the husband and detriment of the wife." Section 8 of article XVI of the Michigan Constitution of 1908 (which is virtually identical to section 5 of article
XVI of the Michigan Constitution of 1850) provides that:
The real and personal estate of every woman, acquired before marriage, and all property to which she may afterwards become entitled by gift, grant, inheritance or devise shall be and remain the
estate and property of such woman, and shall not be liable for the
debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and may be devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried.
Notwithstanding this constitutional provision and the provisions of
the Married Women's Act,' 2 the Supreme Court of Michigan has
uniformly held that a husband is entitled to all of the income from
and the use of property held by him and his wife as tenants by the
entirety.' 3 Although with one possible exception, all of the cases to
date have dealt with a husband's right to the income from real property,' 4 the same rule presumably would apply to income from personalty held by the entirety under the rationale of DeYoung v. Mesler,15
9. Cf. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
10. See Actuarial Values for Estate and Gift Tax (IRS Publication No. 11) ch. 6 &
Table IX, reprinted in 1 CCH FED. ESTATE & GIFT TAX REP.
1209, 1209.35, 1209.85

(1966). For gift tax purposes, the actuarial value of the spouses' property interests is
irrelevant where the donated property is real estate and the amount of the gift is
to be determined under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2515(a) or (b).
11. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-2(c) (1958); Actuarial Values for Estate and Gift Tax
(IRS Publication No. 11) ch. 6, p. 26, reprinted in 1 CCH FED. ESTATE & GIFT TAX
REP. 1 1209, 1209.35 (1966).
12. MicHi. Comp. LAWS § 557.1 (1948).
13. E.g., In re Thomas Estate, 341 Mich. 158, 67 N.W.2d 85 (1954); Dombrowski v.
Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 NA. 293 (1939); Way v. Root, 174 Mich. 418, 140 N.W.
577 (1913); Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904).
14. The possible exception is Dombrowski v. Gorecki, supra note 13, which involved,
inter alia, the income from a grocery business conducted on realty held by the entirety.
15. 373 Mich. 499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964); see note 3 supra.
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namely that a spouses' ownership of certain classes of personalty
should not be treated any differently than their ownership of realty.
Granting the husband such prerogatives over the income from personalty adds substantially to the significance of the rule since gifts
of realty between spouses occur relatively infrequently due to the
effect of section 2515 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
The right of a husband to all of the income from property held
by the entirety has significance for purposes of federal income as
well as gift taxation. The income tax questions arise when the
husband and wife file separate returns, since it is then necessary
to determine whether all of the income should be taxed to the husband or divided between the spouses. In Commissioner v. Hart,1
the Sixth Circuit held that the income from Michigan property
held by the entirety was to be taxed one-half to each spouse. The
court's decision was grounded on its erroneous conclusion that, under Michigan law, the husband was not entitled to all of the income from the property, but rather that each spouse was entitled
to one-half. The court stated that the Michigan Supreme Court decisions holding that the creditors of a husband could not garnish
the income from property held by the entirety constituted a repudiation of the rule laid down in the earlier decision in Morrill v. Morrill17 that the husband had the right to all of the income. The court
apparently overlooked the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Way v. Root,18 which, while holding that the income from property held by the entirety could not be reached by the husband's
creditors, expressly noted that the husband was entitled to all of
the income. Moreover, subsequent to Hart, the Michigan Supreme
Court has adhered to its holding in Morrill.'9 However, notwithstanding the patent error of the Hart decision, the weight of precedent is such that in subsequent tax cases, the holding of Hart became indisputable.20 Moreover, several attorneys who have been
practicing in Michigan have indicated that the Internal Revenue
Service has also accepted the Hart view and has applied the gift and
income tax laws as if the income from Michigan property held by
the entirety should be divided equally between the spouses.
Ironically, it is remotely possible that the Hart view has been
correct since 1963. It has been suggested that the 1963 constitution
of Michigan pre-empts the Morrilldecision and gives a wife the right
to one-half of the income from property held by the entirety. However, an examination of the 1963 constitution and the Official Record
16. 76 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1935).
17. 138 Mich. 112, 101 N.W. 209 (1904).
18. 174 Mich. 418, 140 N.W. 577 (1913).
19. In re Thomas' Estate, 341 Mich. 158, 67 N.W.2d 85 (1954); Dombrowski v.
Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678,289 N.W. 293 (1939).
20. See Oren C. White, 18 T.C. 385, 386 (1952).
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of the Constitutional Convention gives little support to that view.
Section 1 of article X of the 1963 constitution is very similar to
the previously quoted section 8 of article XVI of the 1908 constitution, except for two sentences that were added in the 1963 provision.
One, which is relevant to the issue at hand, reads: "The disabilities
of coverture as to property are abolished." The impact (if any) of
this constitutional provision on the husband's right to income depends upon whether his right is a product of the common-law view
of marital unity, or whether it is merely an attribute of a tenancy
by entirety, that is, when Michigan adopted the estate of a tenancy
by the entirety, it adopted it with all of its common-law attributes,
including the right of the husband to all of the income from the
property. While the Morrill decision expressly left open that question, 2 ' the Michigan Supreme Court apparently adopted the second
rationale (that is, an attribute of the tenancy by entirety) in Way v.
Root.2 2 Indeed, it is only if the husband's right is an attribute of the
tenancy that it could have survived the 1850 constitutional provision and the adoption of the Married Women's Act. Consequently, it
is doubtful that the denial of income to a wife constitutes a disability
of coverture that was abolished by the 1963 constitution. Moreover,
the Official Record of the Constitutional Convention strongly indicates that the delegates did not believe that the added sentence
effected any change in existing law 23 However, the existing rule
is an anachronism, and hopefully the legislature will specifically
eliminate it.
II. ESTATE PLANING FoRms
The principal significance of the book under review lies in its
forms rather than its textual material. The authors reproduce numerous tables, tax return forms, sample petitions, complaints, and
other forms which are quite useful. They have provided a suggested
form for obtaining information concerning a client's holdings and
the size and nature of his probable estate, and another suggested
21. 138 Mich. at 113, 101 N.W. at 209.
22. 174 Mich. at 429-30, 140 N.W. at 581.
23. The delegates first struck the sentence, "The disabilities of coverture are
abolished" from the proposed section of the constitution because they were uncertain
of its meaning and fearful that it would change existing law. MIcHuGA CONSTITrnoNAL
CONVENTION 1961-1962, OFFicIAL REcoR. 3001-03. The sentence was revised to read in

its present form (limited to property) and re-offered as an amendment and adopted.
Id. at 3149-51. In support of that final amendment, one of the proponents for adopting

the sentence, Mr. Everett, stated that the disabilities of coverture had been stuck down
in modem times and that the proposed sentence enunciates
as a principle that these common law disabilities may never again arise in the
State of Michigan, and we are affording those who have some question about it

the assurance that the legislature never can take this away ....

[The legislature]

would never have the nerve to take it away. But it doesn't change the fact that

this is a historical declaration of women's freedoms ....
Id. at 3150.
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form for illustrating the results of a hypothetical administration of
the client's assets so that the problems under existing arrangements
can be more easily located. These two forms are well-designed and
should be of considerable assistance to the practitioner.
The heart of the book is the authors' forms for drafting wills
and trusts. These forms are at least as good as those provided by
the average form book. Of course, a draftsman should use form
books to suggest points to be covered and language to be employed,
but each draftsman must assume the responsibility for adapting
that language to the peculiar needs of his client-a principle that
is no less applicable to the authors' forms than to those of any other
form book. Thus, if these forms are approached with the skepticism
that is desirable in using all form books, they should be useful.
Several provisions in the authors' forms warrant discussion and
should be examined with particular care. For example, the authors
have provided a form2 4 for a funded revocable trust, the income
from which is to be paid to the settlor during his life. However,
the trust instrument does not make any provision for distributing
corpus to the settlor should he have need thereof, although there
is always the danger that a settlor could become incompetent and
thereby lose his power to revoke the trust. 25 In such event, the
settlor's guardian would be powerless to revoke the trust and while
a court could do so on petition, 6 judicial revocation of an incompetent's revocable trust could be obtained only where it is shown
that the trust funds are needed for the proper care and support of
the settlor, and then only to the extent of that need.2 7 Consequently,
unless the trustee is explicitly given discretion to distribute corpus
to the settlor, the settlor's incompetency could make it difficult and
expensive (or even impossible in some cases) to recapture the funds
for the settlor's use. The significance of this defect in the authors'
form is pointed up by the fact that a prime underlying purpose
of a funded revocable trust (particularly where the settlor is elderly)
is to provide for the continuous administration of the trust's assets
and for the care of the settlor should he become incompetent, without undergoing the pain and publicity attending a suit to declare
the settlor incompetent. This purpose might well be frustrated
if the authors' form is employed.
At the settlor's death, the form in question (Form Section I)
provides that the trust corpus of the revocable trust is to be divided
24. CHIRCO &cWARD, MICHIGAN AND FEDERAL ESTATE AND TAX PLANNING Forms
Section I, at 177-88 (1965). Whenever a reference is made herein to a "Forms Section,"
it shall refer to the forms listed by that system in the book under review.
25. ]3OGERT, TRusrs & TRusTEEs § 1000, at 491-92 (2d ed. 1962).
26. Ibid.
27. E.g., Simmons v. First Federal Say. & Loan, 132 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1955);
Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576,2 N.W.2d 140 (1942).
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into two separate funds, each of which is in turn divided into two
trusts. Looking at one of the two funds (the Beatrice I. Whitman
Fund), one-half of it is to be placed in Trust A, and one-half in
Trust B. Trust A grants the settlor's daughter, Beatrice I. Whitman,
a general power of appointment over the trust corpus, exercisable
either during her life or by her will. There is no authorization for
the trustee to distribute income or corpus to Beatrice unless and
until she exercises her power. Also, no persons are named as alternative takers of the trust estate in the event that Beatrice fails to
exercise her power. Should Beatrice become incompetent before
all of the trust corpus has been withdrawn, there would be considerable difficulty in obtaining trust funds for her from Trust A,
which funds may be needed where the assets of Trust B (which are
available for her) have been exhausted. In addition, if Beatrice
should die without exercising her power, it is unclear whether the
trust corpus should be distributed as part of Beatrice's estate or
whether it should revert to the settlor's estate. 28 A reversion to the
settlor's estate would increase both probate and administrative expenses, which increase could easily be avoided by naming takers
in default of the power.
A second form that warrants particular discussion is the authors'
method of distributing trust assets to the descendants of a testator
(where the testator's wife has predeceased him). In Form Section B,
the authors provide that the trust estate shall be divided into equal
shares: one for each living child of the testator and his wife, and
one for the living issue per stirpes of any deceased child. Each share
is to be distributed to the beneficiary thereof when he or she attains
the age of twenty-one. The will further provides (Form Section B
3.4):
Should any child or issue die before becoming entitled to receive
distribution of the entire trust set aside for him or her, such trust,
or its undistributed remainder shall be held for and distributed to
his or her then living issue, per stirpes, or should no such issue be
then living, such trust shall go to augment equally the shares then
held for the benefit of, and those previously distributed to, other
children, excluding each child theretofore deceased leaving no issue
living but including by right of representation the then living lawful issue of any deceased child.
This paragraph (or one substantially similar to it) appears in a
number of the forms included in the book. While there is nothing
technically wrong with this method of distribution if the testator
wishes his property to be so divided, it is unlikely, as a practical
matter, that many testators would desire this arrangement for the
28. See Jones, Consequences of an Ineffective Appointment-Capture, 18 ALA. L.
REv. 229 (1966).
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disposition of the assets held on behalf of a surviving grandchild
of the testator where the grandchild dies prior to his twenty-first
birthday. By way of illustration, assume that John Testator died
and was survived by his fifteen-year-old son, Paul, his twenty-fiveyear-old son, Frank, and by two grandchildren, Mary (age six) and
Robert (age four), both of whom are children of the Testator's eldest
son, Walter, who predeceased the Testator. Under the will, the
trustee would distribute one-third of the trust estate to Frank, and
would hold one-third in trust for Paul, one-sixth in trust for Mary,
and one-sixth in trust for Robert. Assume further that Robert died
two years after the Testator. In such a case, under the above-quoted
provision, Robert's one-sixth share of the estate will be divided
equally among Frank and the two trusts held for Mary and Paul
respectively. It is likely that the testator would have preferred that
on Robert's death, all of his one-sixth share be added to Mary's
trust, but, under the quoted provision, her trust would receive
only a one-eighteenth share. It could be contended that the paragraph as written should be construed so that, at Robert's death, his
share is added to Mary's trust, but the language of the paragraph
does not support that construction and it would require a liberal
reading of the provision to achieve that result.
Finally, particular attention should be given to the authors'
form for a marital deduction trust. One such form29 grants very
broad administrative powers to the trustees and the existence of
several of those powers could possibly disqualify the trust for the
marital deduction allowance. For example, the trustees are authorized to retain in the trust non-income-producing property owned
by the testator at his death; 30 the trustees are given very broad
powers of investment without restriction as to non-income-producing property;3 1 and the trustees are given very broad powers to determine which payments and receipts constitute income and which
constitute principal and "their decision shall be conclusive and
binding against all persons interested hereunder."3 2 Concededly,
the granting of such powers may not disqualify the trust for the
marital deduction, but the dollar value of the deduction is often
29. Forms Section D.

30. Forms Section G 1.I. The will containing the marital deduction trust adopts by
reference the powers contained in Forms Sections G 1.1-.10. See Forms Section D 10.1.
This authority could run afoul of Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) & (5) (1958).
31. Forms Section G 1.5.
This authority also involves some danger of violating the
requisites discussed in Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-5 (f)(4) & (5) (1958), but the risk is less
significant than that caused by the power given under Forms Section G 1.1.
32. Forms Section G 1.6. This provision may also violate Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)5(f)(4) (1958), unless local law will impose reasonable limitations on the trustees'
exercise of this power; a recent Ohio case, Sherman v. Sherman, 5 Ohio St. 2d 27, 213
NE.2d 360 (1966), illustrates the risk in relying on local law for that purpose. Cf. Treas.
Reg. § 1.674(b)-l(b)(5)(i) (1956) for an indication of the risk in providing that a trustee's
determination shall be conclusive.
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of such magnitude that no risk, however small, should be deliberately undertaken. The draftsman might consider restricting the
trustee powers for a marital trust more than those granted to other
trusts in the same will. In any event, it will often be desirable to
authorize the widow to compel the sale of any non-productive or
under-productive assets in the marital trust, so that the conditions
of Treasury Regulation sections 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) and (5) (1958)
are satisfied in that regard. In order to forestall an attack against
the marital deduction trust because of the broad administrative
powers granted the trustees, the authors provided that the trustees
should have all the powers and discretions given under the will
"except those, the possession of which would deprive any estate of
said marital deduction under the tax laws, and the rulings and
regulations with respect thereto, in force at the time of the determination of said marital deduction. 3 . 3 While there is no harm in
using that clause, it would appear that the Internal Revenue Service4
regards such provisions as a nullity. In Revenue Ruling 65-144,
the Service ruled that a similar provision was ineffective for purposes of determining whether powers otherwise granted to trustees
would disqualify gifts to the trust for the charitable deduction. That
does not mean that the suggested paragraph should not be used, for
it does provide additional support for qualification, and litigation
may someday prove the Service wrong.35 However, the paragraph
should be used (if at all) only as a backstop and every effort should
be made to avoid granting the trustees powers that might disqualify
the trust for the marital deduction.
In conclusion, the authors have provided a form book with annotations and textual discussion that should be of use to Michigan
practitioners. Omissions cannot be avoided in a book of this size
dealing with such a broad subject, and if each of one hundred attorneys were to decide what should be included and what omitted,
we undoubtedly would have one hundred different books. Consequently, it is difficult to fault the authors for exercising their independent judgments in that matter.
Douglas A. Kahn,
Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Michigan
33. Forms Section D 3.5. See also Forms Section H 2.6.
34. 1965-1 Cm . BuLL. 442.
35. Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944),
which is cited in the abovementioned Ruling, is distinguishable, but does lend some
support to the Service's position.

